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ABSTRACT 
Under the guise of the "incumbency advantage" American research of the 
past decade has devoted heavy emphasis to what may be termed the "persona l vote" 
in Congressional elections. Is this phenomenon a purely American one, or is it 
something susceptible to comparative treatment? This paper contrasts the 
personal vote in the 1980 U. S .  House elections with that in the 1979 Bri tish 
General Election. The analysis ut ilizes data from surveys conducted by the 
Center for Political Studies and British Gallup , respectively, in combination 
with interviews of House AAs and British MPs and party agents whose 
constituencies fall in the sampling frames of the mass surveys. The analysis 
f inds an incumbency advantage or personal vote in Britain, much weaker than that 
in the U , S, ,  but of somewhat greater importance than is commonly believed , As 
in the U. S .  const ituency service appears to be an important component of the 
personal vote. 
THE CONSTITUENCY SERVICE BASIS OF THE PERSONAL VOTE FOR 
U . S .  REPRESENTATIVES AND BRITISH MPS 
Bruce E .  Cain, John A. Ferejohn and Morris P .  Fiorina 
INTRODUCTION 
During the past decade an especial ly active research area has 
developed around the study of the advantages of incumbency in U . S .  
House elections . Erikson ( 1972) and Mayhew ( 1974) first cal led 
attention to the t emporal increase apparent over the course of the 
1 960 s ,  and succeeding s cholars too numerous to cite have sought to 
refine the measur ement of,  explain the bases of,  and determine the 
consequences o f ,  the trends i dentif ied by Erikson and Mayhew [l], 
This outpouring of s cholarly effort has produced a reasonable 
underst anding of the mul ti-faceted nature ot the incumbency advantage 
in contemporary ele ctions , though the lack of appropriate longitudinal 
data hinders ef for ts to determine precisely what and how much has 
changed over time (Fiorina , 1982) , 
As with much of the Congres sional literature, a notable 
f eature of the re s earch on House incumbency is its exclusively 
American perspectiv e .  In particular ,  attempt s to explain the 
development and bases of the incumbency advantage focus on American 
political insti tutions and the American social and cul tural context . 
Little effort has been made to compare candidate effects  in House 
el ections with those which might be present in the legisl ative 
2 
elections of other countries [2] , And virtual ly no effort has been 
given to abstract ing from the American case in an ef fort to develop 
more widely applicable the ories of the conditions which enhance or 
depress candidate effect s in legi sl ative e lection s .  Thi s  paper aims 
principally at the former, empirica l ,  lacuna , While the 
meaningfulness  of any sort of comparative work depends on some basic 
theore tical ideas which render comparison meaningful and interesting , 
a detailed comparative theory of voting in legi slative elections l ies 
out side the scope of this paper, 
THE CONCEPT OF A PERSONAL VOTE 
By "personal vote" we mean that portion of a candidate's 
electoral support which ari ses from his or her personal 
characteristics , qualifications,  activities and/or record ,  In 
legislative ele ctions especial ly, political science research 
emphasizes that part of the vote which is  not persona l -- support 
based on shared partisan aff iliations , f ixed voter characteris tics 
such as clas s ,  religion and ethnicity , reacti ons to national 
conditions such as the state of the economy, and performance 
evaluations centered around the head of the governing party . This 
imbalance in emphasis  is  reasonable enough; mo s t  empirical work 
suggests that factors such as the preceding account for the l ion' s 
share of the variation in election out comes .  Only after the 
realization in the United States that the personal vote had reached 
significant proportions did scholars real ly give it much at tention. 
Sti l l ,  even if smal l ,  the personal vote has potential ly great 
political signif icance, For unlike party or cla s s  ident ifications , 
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religious affiliations , the national economy , or national executive 
performance , the individual legisl ator by definition has some impact 
on the personal vo te,  Al though small,  the fact that it is  under his 
control may lead him to give it disproportionate attention, And this 
in turn has implications for party cohesion in the legi slature , party 
support for the executive , and ul timately , the abil ity to enforce 
national electoral accountability in the system [3], For a personal 
vote ref lects a principal feature of the single-member district 
electoral system: the di stinction between the intere sts and fortunes 
of an individual representative and the interes t s  and fortunes of any 
col lect ivity, especially party, to which he or she may belong , It is  
logica l ly po ssible for a particular representative to survive while 
all fellow partisans go down to defeat , That s imple fact creates an 
incentive for each representative to build a personal base of support 
within the geographic dis trict , support not subject to the vagaries of 
national swings arising from popular reactions to na tional event s ,  
personali tie s ,  and condi tions . To be sure , myriad features of a 
political system may work to circumscribe the operation of the 
individual representative ' s  incent ive -- the resources available to 
him, the nomination system ,  the electoral system ( e . g .  independent 
execut ive or not), the needs , ideologies , and party loyaltie s of 
constituent s -- to name but a few of the more obvious one s .  Thu s ,  the 
gap between individual and collect ive interests may be large in some 
systems (eg, the American) and virtual ly non-exi st ent in others (eg . 
the textbook British portrait) , The incent ive still exi st s ,  however ,  
and fragment s of the existing l iterature gave u s  reason t o  be lieve 
that it operates even in Great Britain, though with effect s much 
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weaker than tho se observed in the United State s ,  
To put some f lesh on this abstract di scus sion, consider the 
preliminary statistical analysis presented in Table 1 .  The data are 
from the 1980 NES/CPS American National Elect ion Study , and a British 
Gallup survey conducted after the May 1979 election [4], The 
estimates (probit) show the association of party identification, 
execut ive performance ratings, and candida te incumbency s tatus ( coded 
from st andard sources and merged with the survey files) with the vote 
f or or against the Parl iamentary and Congre ssional candidates of the 
incumbent Labour and Democratic parties , Evidently , the American and 
Bri tish findings differ in several respect s ,  Fir s t ,  parti sanship 
exerts a much larger impact , ceteris paribus ,  in British Parl iamentary 
voting than in American House voting , The literature would lead us to 
expect this dif ference , though it would also lead us to expect that 
the difference has increased from what it  would have been in say, the 
late 1940s. A se cond even more noteworthy difference between the two 
equations concerns the importance of Cal laghan ratings for the fates 
of Labour candidates,  and the virtual irrelevance of Carter ratings 
for the fates of Democratic candidates [5], Again, the se results are 
consistent with the tenor of traditional di scussions of British voting 
behavior, and the more recent studies of Hou se elec tions . From the 
st andpoint of this paper, principal interest attaches to a third 
difference be tween the two equations: the much greater importance of 
incumbency status in American House elections than in British 
Parl iamentary elections , The differences here are ful ly as great , 
ceteris paribus ,  a s  those between the effects o f  party ident ification 
and executive rating s ,  
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[Table 1 Here] 
Stil l ,  we daresay that·most scholars wil l be less taken by the 
difference in the importance of incumbency status in the two countries 
than in the fact that statistically signif icant effect s show up in 
Great Britain at all, For the estimates clear ly show that o ther 
things equal Labour incumbents ran significantly better than Labour 
candidates conte s ting open seats, and the latter in turn ran 
signif icantly be tter than Labour candidates se eking to unseat 
incumbents of any o ther party, While signifi cant , the se effects are 
not substantively large -- Table 2 contains a translation of the 
probit estimates into probabilities of supporting candidates of the 
incumbent party as a function of the respondent ' s  party affil iation 
and executive performance ratings , and the incumbency s tatus of the 
constituency, Each party ID category is assigned the modal executive 
rating of that category, 
[Table 2 Here] 
As seen, the impact of Conservative party identifica tion was 
so strong in 1 97 9  that candidate incumbency status made little or no 
d iff erence ( the raw data show that all of the 81 strong Conserva t ive s 
in Labour districts voted against the incumbent), This contrast s 
s tarkly with the American case where even s trong Republicans showed a 
no table tendency to support Democratic incumbent s, For those not 
attached to the Conserva tive Party, however, the effect s of incumbency 
status were more pronounced, Voters offering no party identif ica tion, 
for example, were twice as likely to vote for an incumbent Labour 
candidate as f or a Labour candida te running against an incumbent of 
another party. The figures are similar for Liberals, and even weak 
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Labour identifiers show a non-trivial effect of incumbency status, In 
the U. S . , of course , the general effects of incumbency ( looking across 
the rows) are relatively much s tronger, perhaps one-half to two thirds 
the effects of party identif ication ( looking down the columns), 
Tables 1 and 2 sugge st that there is indeed a personal vote 
for us to compare, contrast,  and explain. Given the amount of 
re search devoted to this subject in the American ca se,  our emphasis  in 
the body of the paper wil l be on the British . By way of introduction, 
let us briefly consider several of the component s of the personal vo te 
ident if ied in American research and how they may or may not apply to 
the British ca se . The first and mo st obvious explanation of the House 
incumbency advantage arise s from the sheer quantity of electoral ly 
productive re sources provided to all incumbents -- staff,  office s ,  
long di st ance,  the frank, etc,, estimates o f  the value o f  which range 
up to a mil lion dollars per term. This is a factor which can hardly 
operate in Britain because MPs have very little in the way of personal 
support . The average MP shares a secretary and may work with a party 
agent in the constituency [6], Another partial explana tion of the 
House incumbency advantage focuses on the differential campaign 
funding of incumbents and chal lengers ( Jacobson, 1 980) , In Britain 
however, campaigns are much cheaper, spending is severely l imited , 
candidates do not raise money individually, and s pending decisions are 
more centralized, Thu s ,  the f i�ancial muscle of MPs would seem to be 
a hypo thesis that we can safely dismiss .  Third , some authors have 
sugge sted that less tangible factors partially explain the House 
incumbency advantage, One could argue that strong incumbent s deter 
s trong challenger s ,  and that incumbent s trength is at least to some 
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extent a self-fulf illing prophecy which results when weak challengers 
are the only ones willing to make the race , Here again, the 
hypothesis  would not appear as plausible for Britain. Unlike American 
candidates who look for the proper time to run , aspiring MPs look for 
a sui table location -- a winnable if not safe, distric t .  A principal 
way to qualify for the nomina tion in such a district is  to earn a 
reputation as a good candidate, and the principal way to do that i s  to 
wage a good campaign in a hopeles s district . King ( 1982) reports that 
in the 1 970 s Parliaments one-half of all MPs had lo s t  at leas t  once 
before winning their seats , and one-fourth had lost twice or more [7] . 
Thus , it appears that incumbent MPs are les s  likely to get an 
electoral free ride than are incumbent MC s ,  given that ambitious 
challengers in Britain can not hope to impres s  future selec tion 
committees by merely "going through the motions . "  
All i n  all, one is pushed t o  the conclusion that the personal 
vote in Britain is very personal indeed. Its existence would seem to 
reflect the particular characteristics and activities of particular 
candida tes, Such a vote is cont ingent; it  depends on whom MPs are and 
what they do , A likely possibility for an important component of this 
cont ingent personal vote corresponds to a fourth partial explanatiop 
of the House incumbency advantage -- con s tituency service, by which we 
mean the non-partisan , non-programmatic effort to help individual 
con stituents in their dealings with the larger government , and to 
defend and advance the particularistic interest s  of the constituency 
in the councils of the larger government . In the next section of this 
paper we present new data on const ituency service in Britain, some 
from the mas s  survey already introduced, as well as additional data 
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from an elite survey coordinated with the mas s  s urvey sampling frame , 
Analogous American data also will be presented, In the fourth section 
of the paper we report stati stical analyses which show the importance 
of constituency service as an explana tion of the personal vote.  A 
concluding section relates our f indings to discussions of embryonic 
developments in the British electoral proces s .  
CONSTITUENCY SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES 
The textbook portrait of British politics leaves lit tle room 
for a personal vote. Though MPs appear desirous of retaining their 
office (the retirement rate in 1979 was about 10%) , and thus have an 
incent ive to fashion a personal vote, the ins trument s available to 
them appear too paltry to permit them to do so.  Most MP s  are faceless 
troop s  in the party ranks who vote in ac cord with the party whip . 
They have little or no personal power (eg .  committee based a s  in the 
U. S . )  to use to procure pork for their districts or to provide 
services to individual const ituent s. As mentioned , they have very 
li t tle in the way of s taff and office resources , and their campaign 
spending is limited and largely out of their control . Their 
parliamentary careers are determined not by electoral longevity,  but 
by the impressions they make on party leaders ,  And to cap it  all off,  
their con stituents can register a preference for the execut ive only 
through their vote decisions f or Parliament . As a consequence of all 
thi s ,  voters naturally pay s cant attention to individual MP s ,  and make 
their choices on the basis  of such general factor s as party 
aff iliations,  cla s s  po sition, and reac tions to top party leader s ,  
particularly those who will comprise the government . 
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The preceding textbook portrait is familiar to American 
s cholars ,  many of whom use it to highlight a contrast ing textbook 
portrait of the Congres s .  Like mo s t  textbook portrai t s ,  however, the 
British one is painted in bold relief, Strong tendencies become 
incontrovertible generaliza tions , and traces of inconsi stent evidence 
seem to disappear . Knowledgeable observers of British politics have 
long been aware that MPs are not quite so helples s  and electorally 
irrelevant (or at least don' t believe they are) a s  some textbooks 
suggest, Moreover, the recent literature increasingly focuses on 
changes in Briti sh politics , changes of a kind different from the 
generalizations of the old textbooks, 
A number of British scholars (Chester and Bowring, 1 962; But t ,  
1 967; Crick , 1970) have observed that in the po s twar period the amount 
of time devoted by the average MP to government legislation has 
decreased and the amount devoted to representing cons tituent s against 
the bureaucracy has increased . The phrase "a good constituency man" 
has entered the popular literature on voting (Hartley-Brewer, 1976) , 
and the Liberal-pi oneered strategy of "grass-rooting" has received 
a cademic notice ( Barker and Rush,  1967; King , 1974; King and Sloman, 
1 973) , There is lit tle relevant , data, however, In an older 
contribution Dowse ( 1963) conducted a study of an important aspect of 
const ituency relations -- surgeries via a mail survey of 100 MPs, 
Analysis of 69 responses revealed that only one-f if th of the MPs held 
no surgery whatsoever , and that those with les s than nine year's 
service tended to hold them more frequently than more senior member s .  
But Dowse found n o  relation between electoral margins and f requency of 
surgeries ,  and on that basis concluded that con s tituency work s tems 
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from the "genuine desire to win public es teem and to be of service" 
( 1963 , p. 336) . When queried directly , only one-third of the MP s  
viewed their activity as electorally prof itable , 
In contrast to Dowse, our interviews sixteen years later 
disclose that contemporary MPs are considerably more prone to hold 
surgeries [8], Table 3 presents the relevant data. As seen, 37% of 
Dowse' s 1963 respondent s held no regular surgery; by 1979 only a 
corporal' s guard did not hold surgery on a regular basi s .  At the 
other extreme of the distribution, one-third of Dowse' s  respondents 
held surgeries at least every two weeks , whereas our survey produced a 
figure well over one-half, In the s pace of two decades s urgery has 
apparently become a standard a spect of an MP's life, 
[Table 3 here] 
Surgeries produce contact with const ituent s ,  generally those 
having some reque s t ,  grievance or whatever vis-a-vis the government . 
Our interviews explored the topic of casework a t  length , and a few of 
the salient features of the responses will be of interes t  before 
proceeding to the statistical analyses [9], As government has grown 
one would naturally expect that demands in the f orm of casework would 
grow commensurately . But some authors (Fiorina , 1977) have 
hypothes ized that electoral incentives lead legislators to stimula te 
constituent demands, To be sure, there is  a broad range of 
possib ilities , from a s imple invitation in a newsletter for 
constituents to write to a given address to pas sing out s t amped , pre­
addressed postcard s  in nursing homes . At any rate, the interviews 
revealed that at least some level of solicitation is the rule (85%) in 
the U. S .  The figure is considerably lower (64%) in Britain, though a 
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clear majori ty indicates some degree of initiat ive. In contrast,  MPs 
are more likely ( 50%) to seek publici ty for succes sful casework. 
While MCs publicize casework in general terms and in the aggregate , 
they more of ten ( 67%) express the sentiment that publici z ing the 
details of cases would be an invasion of their con s tituent s'  privacy,  
In the U . S .  the most common types of casework are social 
security and veterans '  benef its (almo st universally mentioned, In 
Britain the most f requent sources of citi zen requests/complaint s stem 
from housing ( mentioned b y  85% of our interviewees ) ,  pen sions 
( ment ioned by 72%) , taxes (37%) , and immigration (22%) , Thus , the 
single mo st C01Illllon source of ca sework in Britain ie a program which i s  
legally a responsibility o f  local government. An overwhelming 
majori ty of MP s  ( 83%) report that they do handle such local casework , 
though a considerable proportion (33%) do so with reluctance, In 
contra s t , '  a majority of MCe report that they do not handle s tate and 
local cases , thougli they would advise const ituents on the appropriate 
offi cials to contact. 
Obviously , MPs are not geared up to handle casework to the 
same extent ae MC s -- they have nothing like the large dis trict 
staffs , mobile vane, and other American innovations. Moreover, the 
much smaller s ize of British con stituencies (about 90 ,000 people on 
average,  ae opposed to 500 ,000 in the U . S . )  would lead ue to expect a 
smaller case load, Considering these fact s ,  the estimated case loads 
reported in Table 4 are higher than we had expected, Given that many 
MPs s t ill answer their mail in longhand , their reported workload is  
quite impressive. 
[Table 4 here] 
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So, there is a great deal of constituency oriented activity 
apparent in Great Britain. And while we have presented data only on 
casework, MPs are in their conetiuenciee more often than they hold 
surgery: the modal MP returns to the constituency at least weekly 
( many of them, of course, live in London) , and more than 80% go home 
at least twice a month, At least partially as a result of this 
contact,  MPs enjoy high visibility in their con s tituencie s .  Referring 
back to the mas s surveys ,  incumbent MPs enjoyed a name recall figure 
of 70% in 1979 , more than twice the level achieved by MCe [ 1 0], About 
an eighth of British respondents claimed to have met their MP 
personally. 
Does the constituency attentiveness of an MP have any 
electoral payoff? There i s  little data which directly addres see the 
question. As mentioned, only 32% of Dowse'e 1963 respondents thought 
that it did, In our survey, however , 83% ( 57 of 69) answered 
defini tely yes ,  and another 16% thought that a limited e f fect was 
present, Only one MP flatly denied an electoral effect. Thie 
response di stribution is virtually the same ae that for MCe , though 
very different from that which Dowse reports. Perhaps there has been 
a major temporal change, or perhaps Dowee'e respondents hesitated to 
commit a seeming ly erase admi s sion to paper. Interestingly, however, 
Barker and Rush ( 1970 , p. 177) note that their interviewees 
universally believed that their personal reputations and activities 
had some impact on the vote. Like those interviewed by Barker and 
Rush, and unlike those surveyed by Dowse, the MPs in our sample 
believe in the electoral efficacy of their activities, 
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British academics , however, tend to accept the findings 
reported by Dowse .  Like Congressional scholars of the 1960s , British 
scholars appear reluctant to believe that MPs might succumb to mundane 
electoral tempt ations . The edited transcript s of the King and Sloman 
( 1973) BBC interviews reflect (and to some extent , underlie) the 
prevail ing consensus; they are worth quo ting at some l ength. The 
f irst segment comes from a conver sation wi th Shirley Wil liams , then a 
member of the Labour shadow cabine t ,  and Norman Tebbit,  a junior Tory 
MP ,  though one from an extremely safe district . The program was 
titled , ''M . P . s  and their Surgeries" (King and S loman , ·  1973 , pp . 13-
1 4) : 
King: If it takes up so much time , if M . P . s have to write so 
many lett er s ,  if they s ometimes f ind the work depressing , why 
do almost a£ 1 members of Parliament hold surgeries? The cynic 
would say 'in order to win votes ,  of course,' But the cynic 
would be wrong . There is no evidence that this sort of 
careful individual con s tituency work makes any substantial 
difference at the time of a general election, and M . P . s  know 
i t .  I asked Shirley Williams how far she thought her surgery 
work helped her win the al legiance of the voter s .  
Williams : I don't think that it make s much difference. All 
you can say is that perhaps you gradual ly build up a 
reputation as a conscientious or reasonably hard-working M . P . , 
and that i s  of some advantage . But with the individual cases 
I suspect there's almo st no influence at all, 
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King: How much advantage -- hundreds of vote s ,  thousands? 
Wil liams : At most , hundreds . 
King : Norman Tebbit seemed surprised even to be aske d .  Had 
he won any votes that morning? 
Tebbi t :  Do you know I've never thought of it? I can't say 
that f or me the favourite part of my life as a Member of 
Parliament is being a social worker,  • • •  But I just regard it  
as part of my job and , as to whether i t  wins votes or not, you 
know , I'm not real ly particularly interested . 
Similarly, in a segment ti tled "The Case of Flora Gene tio" 
(King and S loman , 1 973 , pp . 26-27) , we read the fol lowing col loquy 
be tween Professor King and Roy Hatters l ey ,  then a Labour front­
bencher : 
King: But in the end doesn't a l l  this consti tuency work, 
doesn't the writing of all the s e  letter s ,  the holding of 
s urgeries and advisory sessions , boil down to an effort to win 
votes ,  to make sure of get ting in next time? Roy Hat tersley, 
and I think most M . P . s would deny this vigorousl y .  How much 
help, I asked Roy Hat tersley,  do you think your con stituency 
work is going to help towards your re-election when the time 
comes? 
Hattersley : Very little indeed, My re-election when the time 
comes depends on the standing of the two parties . I hope I 
shal l po l l  about nineteen or twenty thousand votes .  If two or 
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three hundred o f  tho se are the result o f  my constituency work , 
I shal l have done rather wel l .  
King: Why, then, does he do the work? 
Hattersley: I do the const ituency work, not for a pol itical 
bonus,  because there i sn't a political bonus in i t .  I d o  it  
because it's part of the job . 
King: Part of an M . P . s job , The non-parti san, non-speech­
making , little-publicized part that goes on week in and week 
out , even when Parl iament is in reces s .  
Evidently, the MP s  quoted above do not offer the same opinions 
as 57 of the 69 we interviewed . Perhaps our interviewees were merely 
having fun with naive Americans , or perhaps they understood the 
question in a manner different from the way in which it was intended . 
But then again, perhaps con stituency work is a more important concern 
of backbenchers,  who are seldom interviewed, than of frontbenchers ,  
whom professors favor. Perhaps too , prominent politicians are loathe 
to announce over the BBC that their actions stem from anything but the 
highest of motives .  
At any rate , there are a t  least three que st ions which research 
would do well to keep separate . ( 1) Do MPs believe their 
const ituency work has el ectoral payoffs? Based on our interviews we 
think the answer is now generally yes .  ( 2) Is the constituency work 
of MPs motivated primarily by el ectoral considerations? The academic 
consensus is probably no , but in any event as certaining "real " 
motivations is terribly difficul t .  (3) Whatever the motivation, doe s  
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constituency work have an elect oral impact? Aside from Dowse, an 
older study of the electoral strength of "experienced" candidates in 
65 marginal seats ( Will iams , 1966-67) , and a re cent study of 18 
marginals  by Cur tice and Steed, ( 1980) , there is little research that 
sheds light on this la s t  ques tion. The next section of the paper 
presents some f indings ba sed on the elite interviews and mass surveys 
introduced in the preceding page s .  
CONSTITUENCY SERVICE AND THE VOTE , GREAT BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES 
Both mas s  surveys pursued the subject of constituency service 
at some length . Consti tuents were asked whether they had ever 
contacted the incumbent , if so , why, whether they had got ten a 
response,  and whether they considered the response satisfactory . In 
the U. S .  about one in seven respondents ( a  higher proportion of actual 
voter s ,  of course ) had initiated some communi cation with their MC , 
Seven percent reported that they had requested help , four percent that 
they sought information, and four percent that they expre s se d  their 
opinions . In Great Britain one in 12 respondent s had contacted their 
MP, with f ive percent request ing help, two percent information, and a s  
would b e  expecte d ,  les s than two percent expressing a n  opinion ( 1 1].  
Nearly a l l  constituents in both countries reported that they had 
received a response,  with more than half maintaining that they were 
"very satisf ied" with the response , and less than one-quarter 
repor ting ei ther no response or dissa ti sfaction. 
In addition to personal experience s ,  a f ifth of the American 
sample, and a sixth of the Bri tish claimed they knew of s omeone else 
who had contacted their MC or MP (we refer to this as second hand 
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contact in the discussion which follows) . And one-fifth of the 
American sample and one-eighth of the Briti sh maintained that they 
could recall something s pecial the incumbent had done for the 
district . The probes accompanying this item elicited a very mixed bag 
of responses by the Americans , with only about half referring 
specifically to l oca l concerns and programs . In Britain, however, the 
modal answer, offered by two-f ifths of the respondent s ,  i s  that the 
MP champions l ocal cause s .  Smal ler , roughly equal proportions mention 
housing , local industries ,  aid to individuals  in trouble,  and the MP's 
general interest in loca l affairs, 
Each survey included a general ized evaluative item de s igned to 
tap the incumbent ' s  rela tionship to his cons tituency. Fir s t  included 
in the 1 978 NES/CPS election study , the item was dubbed "expectation 
of acce s s " .  It  was designed to capture some aspect s of Fenno' s  ( 1 978) 
emphasis on the reputation f or acces sibil ity and trustworthine s s  a 
representa tive seeks to develop . We think that the wording of the 
quest ion makes it a fair general measure of the extent to which a 
representative is perceived as "a good constituency man, " It reads , 
If you had a problem that Representative (your MP) (name) 
could do something about , do you think he/she would be very 
helpful , somewhat helpful ,  or not very helpful to you? 
In both countries constituent s expre s se d  fairly po sitive expectations 
[ 12] . Some indication that these expectations have real content and 
are neither purely random nor pure ra tional ization appears in Table 5 .  
The f igures in the table are probit estimates f or statistical mode l s  
i n  which expectations o f  access  are the left hand side variable, The 
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models presume that incumbent s enhance their images by achieving 
visibil ity , and by actual ly compil ing a good record , or at least one 
that is perceived as goo d .  I n  addition cons tituent s may have more 
positive expectations about an incumbent who shares their party 
aff iliation. Conver s e ly, a vi sible challenger might dim the lus ter of 
the incumbent given that the former may attack the incumbent's record ,  
per son, and so forth as part o f  his or her campaign. A l l  o f  these 
suggestions are no more than common sense , and a l l  are reflected in 
the data. 
[Table 5 here] 
The British and American equations are quite sim ilar. MPs may 
get more pol itical mileage out of personal contacts than MCs [ 13], and 
MCs perhaps more out of second hand contacts ( i e .  contac t s  with 
friends , relatives , and co-worker s  the respondent has heard about) ,  
After taking contacts into account , name recall appears to have little 
or no effect in either country [ 14] . Party affil iations are somewhat 
more important , ceteris paribus ,  in Britain, with minor party 
ident if iers significantly les s l ikely to evidence positive 
expectations even than tho se who identify with national parties 
different from the incumbent ' s  (the latter constitute the omitted 
reference category in the set of dummy variables [ 1 5].  Identifiers 
with the incumbent's party of course are the most sanguine about the 
l ikelihood that he or she would help in a pinch. Final ly, in the U. S .  
more senior incumbent s are expected to b e  more helpful than less 
senior ones; no comparable rela tionship i s  apparent in Britain. 
The largest coefficient s in the tabl e ,  however, are those 
which reflect the effects of the incumbent's previous eff ort s .  
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Satisfied constituents are highly po sitive about his or her future 
potent ial , and dissatisfied constituents (rare) highly negative (the 
omitte d  reference category for these dummy variables are comprised of 
those who report no casework experience) [ 16] . Those who reca l l  
something already done f or the cons tituency are likewise very 
po sitive .  These f igures show clearly and not surprisingly that 
incumbent representatives can behave in a manner calculated to enhance 
their constituent s' image s of them, and that conclusion holds f or MPs 
a s  much a s  for MCs .  As yet,  however , we do not know the degree to 
which positive image s  translate into supportive vote s .  
Table 7 represent s a first crack a t  answering the preceding 
q uest ion in the British ca se , while Table 6 presents comparabl e  data 
f or the U . S .  The equations reported in the se tables treat the vote 
decision a s  dependent on the visibil ity of the incumbent and 
chal lenger,  the reputation of the incumbent for being "a good 
constituency man, " the party affil iation of the incumbent vis-a-vis 
the constituent , and evalua tions of the executiv e .  
[Tabl e  6 here] 
Taking the more familiar American resul t s  fir s t ,  the estimates 
out l ine a picture consistent with recent accounts of House elections 
as given in academic writing s ,  the popular pre s s ,  and the lament s of 
pol itical leaders . By achieving v isibil ity and developing a 
reputa tion for cons tituency service the MC can exert a major impact on 
his or her electoral fate, Al l else equal , a very favorable image as 
a good constituency representative i s  more important in determining 
the vote than having the same party affil iation as the voter. As in 
Tabl e  1 the effects of Carter ratings on the House vote in 1980 were 
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nil,  even though the present analysis  is res tricted to incumbent s ,  who 
have a record vis-a-vis Carter. 
And what about Britain? The estimates in Table 7 reveal much 
that anyone would have expected, and perhaps a bit that some would 
not .  As in Table 1 the effects of party identification are nothing 
short of mas s ive ( recal l  that "opposite party ID" is the omi tted 
ref erence category) . How difficult  it is  f or other influences to have 
an impact in the face of such strong par ti san effect s will be shown in 
Table 8 be l ow .  The other major inf luence o n  British voting decisions 
offers a clear contrast to the American resul t s .  Ratings of 
Cal laghan' s performance have a large and significant effect on the 
vote for MP s ,  especial ly for Labour MP s .  Constituents of Tory MP s  who 
rate Cal laghan highly are less  l ikely to support the Tory , ceteris 
paribus , but the effect is only about half that f or constituents of 
Labour MPs [ 17] . 
[Table 7 here] 
Of mo s t  interes t ,  however, are the variables which capture 
aspect s of the personal vote in Britain. As in the U . S .  equa tions , 
incumbent visibility has a po sitive impact on electoral support (and 
chal lenger visibil ity has the expected negative impact ) .  Wel l-known 
incumbents do better than unknowns ,  other things equa l. Of even 
greater interest is the estimate attached to a reputation f or 
constituency service.  Tho se con stituent s who hold highly positive 
expectations of their MP are significantly more l ikely to vote for 
him/her than those not holding such expecta tions . The coefficient s in 
each equation are only signif icant at the . 1 0  level , but we can 
satis fy devotees of the .OS level by pooling the data (making 
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Callaghan rating effects contingent on the party of the MP ) ,  which 
results in a coefficient of .34,  signif icant at the magic level . 
There is no denying , however, tha t the effects of con s tituency service 
are but a shadow of what they are in the U . S .  Table 8 gives some idea 
of the comparat ive magnitude of the effects, In this table the 
variabl e  of interest is the voter's expectation of helpfulne s s, We 
examine six configurations obtained by cro s s ing Labour, Conserva tive,  
and non-identif iers with Labour and Conservative MPs . The f igures in 
the table are calculated from Tables 6 and 7 under the a ssump tion that 
the voter has the modal value for variables  other than expe ctation of 
helpfulness . In the Bri tish cal culations thi s means that the voter i s  
assumed to reca l l  the incumbent , not reca l l  the challenger, and rate 
Callaghan good if a Labour identifier, and fair if a Conservative 
identif ier or a non-identifier . Given these conditions the voters'  
e stimated probabilities of voting f or the incumbent MP are given in 
the top part of the table.  
[Table 8 here] 
The party identification and Cal laghan ra ting effect s are so 
s trong that the vote is almost a foregone conclusion in many ca se s ,  
but at the margins the effect o f  being " a  good constituency man" 
surface s .  The smal lest ef fect is a ,02 increase in the probabil ity 
that a Conservative identifier would support a Conserva tive incumbent , 
whi le the l arge st is a , 16 increase in the probability that a non­
ident ifier would s upport an incumbent of either party ( 18], MPs of 
the major parties are equa l ly capable of earning the votes of 
identifiers of the other party -- about a .06 increase in probability 
of support as a function of a very favorable reputation, ceteris 
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paribus .  The se numbers contras t  with the American figure s in the 
bot tom hal f  of the table [ 19] . There we see that an incumbent ' s  
perceived reputation can have enormous effects, Consider , f or 
example,  the range of probabil ity estimates for identif iers of one 
party who have a MC of the other : these estimates more than triple as 
a function of perceived reputation. All in al l ,  an MC's reputation 
f or helpfulne s s  appears to have a potential impact as great as that of 
party ident if ication, 
How large is the personal vote in Britain? I s  i t  the 
negligible f ew hundred that some MPs dismiss? Using Tables 7 and 8 to 
arrive at a precise estimate is  not easy , inasmuch as the estimates 
vary considerab ly with voter characteri stics and at titude s ,  but for 
il lustrative purpo ses , imagine a hypothetical race in a constituency 
wi th 50 ,000 elect or s .  Looking acros s  our sample we find a 
const ituency quite negative about the expected helpfulne s s  of their 
MP :  8 elect ors distributed O, 11 7 acros s  the categories very 
helpful , somewhat helpful , not very helpful . Another consti tuency is 
dis tributed in exactly the reverse fashion : 7 ,  1 ,  0 ( a  f ew 
constituencies have everyone in the f irst category , incidental ly) . 
App lying ranges of proportions such as tho se in Table 81 and weighting 
by the actual distributions of party identification in Labour and 
Conservative incumbent cons tituencies ,  respectively, we arrive at 
e s t imated differences in expected vote of almost 6% in the case of 
Conservative MPs and almo st 9% in the case of Labour MP s, We hasten 
to emphasize that these are not estimates of the actual personal vote 
in 1979 , even in an "average " cons tituency, but rather illustrations 
of the dif ference between the vote attracting abil ities of MP's with 
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reputations as excellent constituency men and tho s e  with reputations 
as lousy ones, Sti l l, because it is at l east partial ly an MP' s  
decision t o  become known as an excellent constituency man or a lousy 
one, the f igures represent maximum bounds on the personal vote in 
contemporary Britain. 
We recognize, of course, that some readers may be skeptical of 
the kind of exerci se just reported, inasmuch as it relies on a s urvey 
item which measures voter evaluations, and such items alway s entail a 
risk of contamination from other evaluative factors ,  Even given the 
resul ts in Table 5, should we not worry that responses to the 
expectation of acces s  item are in s ome part rationalizations, that 
people who plan to vote for a given incumbent naturally say that he 
would be very helpful? As a precaution against this po s sibility we 
report a second analysis based on the elite surveys discussed in the 
preceding section, Many of our interviewee s voiced the opinion that 
diligent const ituency work could dampen swings against their party or 
augment swings to their party, Given the data they reported, it is a 
fairly straightforward matter to examine the accuracy of their 
belief s .  We f ormulated a simple additive index based on the MP ' s  
de scription of his constituency work, The index gives a value of one 
for each of the following : does the MP encourage ca sework, does the 
MP publ icize successful casework, does the MP handle l ocal cases, and 
does the MP hold s urgery more than twice monthly? The 101 districts 
f or which we have interviews range from zero to f our on this index 
[20], Do the se accounts of constituency work bear any rela tion to 
objective swings in the vote? Table 9 shows that they most certainly 
do . 
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[Tabl e  9 here] 
A noteworthy feature of the 1979 general elect i on was that 
the traditional uniform swing wa s much less uniform than usual : North 
Britain swung to the Conservatives by about 4 .2%, while South Britain 
swung by 7 .7% (Curtice and Steed, 1980, P• 395), Because of regional 
variations, recent analyses of Briti sh electoral behavior have used 
regional swing figures rather than a single national average.  We 
fol low this practice in the analyse s reported in Tabl e  9 by regres sing 
the swing in our sample district s on the swing in their larger region, 
several demographic variab les previously identif ied as important 
( Crewe , 1979) , and their score on the cons tituency work index [21]. 
The resul ts are quite sugge stive. Constituency work has a 
statistical ly significant augmenting impact of be tween 1 . 5 and 2% on 
the swing t o  the Conservatives, and a signif icant dampening impact of 
be tween 3 and 3 . 5% on the swing away from Labour ( ba sed on a 
constituency index score range of four),  Again the f igure for Labour 
is almo st twice that for Conserva tives, consistent with the results of 
the analysis  ba sed on the mass survey, and a l so with the estimates of 
Wil liams ( 1966-1967) f or an earlier period [22], The estimates are 
real istic bounds on the actual size of the personal vote,  moreover, 
since it is wel l within the capability of the average MP to determine 
where he or she scores on the index of constituency work .  We should 
al so note that these estimates are in the general ballpark though 
somewhat larger than tho se calculated by Prof es sors Curtice and S teed 
( 1980 , P• 409) from an analysis of 18 "switched" dis tricts [23] . 
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ESTIMATED PROBAB ILITY OF IN-PARTY VOTE BY PARTY ID. 
EXECUTIVE PERFORMANCE and DISTRICT INCUMBENCY STAWS 
INCUMBENCY 
Great Britain Non-Labour Open Labour 
s. Con - Fair .oo .oo .01 
w. Con - Fair .01 .01 .03 
No Party ID - Fair .15  .21 .32 
Liberal - Fair .07 .1 1 . 18  
w .  Labour - Good .75 .82 .89 
s. Labour - Very Good
• 92 .95 .98 
United States Republican Open Democratic 
s. Rep, Very Poor .04 .11  .32 
W. Rep, Very Poor .06 . 1 4  .39 
Independent , Poor .24 .40 .70 
w. Dem, Good ,36 .54 .81 
S ,  Dem, Good .53 .70 .90 
TABLE 3 
COMPARATIVE FRF.QUENCY OF SURGERIES , 1%3 v. 197 9 
DOUSE ( 1963) CFF ( 1979) 
None 17% 4 
Ad Hoc B asis 20 3 
Les s  than Monthly 4 
Monthly 23 25 
Every 3 Weeks 6 6 
Every 2 Weeks 22 32 
3 Per Month 1 1  
Weekly or More Often 12 1 5  
n 65 100 
TABLE 6 
1980 HOUSE VOTE (INCUMBENT CONTESTED RACES) 
Recall Incumbent 
Recall Challenger 
Challenger Contac t 
Expec tation of 
Helpfulness 
Party ID 













* p < .os 
** p < .01 
t p < .10 
Democratic 


































GREAT BRITAIN INCUMBENT VOTE EQUATIONS 
Labour Conservative 
Incumbent Recall .59** .JJ* 
Challenger Recall - .JO* - .39** 
f'' .42t .3lt Somewhat .15 .24 Expectation of Helpfulness Depends - .06 - .13 Don't Know .34 - .05 
{ Othe< 1.31** .98* 
Party ID None .90** 1.06** 
Same 2.46** 2.56** 
Excellent 1.04* - .59* 
Good 1.04* - .J5t 
JC Job Rating Fair .78t .oo 
Poor .38 .40 
Don't Know 1.30* - .57t 
Constant -2.90** -1. 29** 
n 515 799 
il
2 .65 .67 
86% 87% 
Correctly Predic ted 
* p < .01 
** p < .05 
t p < .10 
TABLE 4 
NUMBER OF CAS ES HANDLED PER WEEK by MCs and MPs 
CONGRESSMEN MPs 
< 20 9% 23% 
21-40 28 23 
41-60 1 8  1 4  
61-80 6 10 
81-100 1 4  8 
1 00+ 16 3 
MV* 10 1 9  
N 1 02 101 
* MV Refused to answer, Didn' t Know . 
TABLE 5 










* p < .05 
** p < .01 











District Service { Independent 
Minor Party ID 
No Party ID 
Same Party ID 
United States Great Britain 
(n = 811) (n = 1041) 
. 36>�* .52** 
.39** .22*1< 
. 24* - .03 
1 .07** .94** 
.17** .57* 











- ,05 .06 
- .01* ,01 










ESTIMATED PROBABILITIES OF INCUMBENT VOTE BY 
EXPECTATION OF HELPFULNESS 
Not Somewhat 
Identification Helpful Helpful 
Lab .88 .91 
None .26 .32 
Cons .06 .08 
Lab .10 .14 
None .54 .60 













• 71 .89 .98 
Dem Ind .56 .80 .96 
Dem Rep .22 .46 .78 
Rep Dem .28 .67 .93 
Rep Ind .52 .86 .98 
Rep Rep .72 .95 .99 
TABLE 9 
EFFECT OF CONSTITUENCY WORK ON SWINGa 
Regional Swing 






* p < .05 
** p < .01 




























Swing is defined as the average of the gain in Conservative share of the 
vote and loss in Labour share. The figures are drawn from the Times 
Guide to the House of Commons 
b Equations (2) and (4) omit non-significant demographic variables 
included in equations (1) and (3). 
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DISCUSS ION 
The estimates reported in the preceding section do not suggest 
that cons tituency work is  a major influence on the vote in Britain, 
Party al legiances and evaluations of party leaders account for the 
lion's share of electoral decision s ,  though it seems clear that party 
loyalty account s  f or less than it once did (Crewe, 1974) . Is it the 
cas e ,  then, that constituency service in Britain i s  of only mild 
academic interest , not deserving o f  any thing l ike the attention it has 
received in the American literature? Po s s ib ly s o ,  pos sibly not ,  
Most obviously,  what i s  o f  importance to tenured profes sors 
seeking to explain variance,  and what is  of importance to elected 
officials seeking to win re-election may not correspond very closely . 
In the short term individual MPs can do little or nothing to change 
the party composition of their const ituencie s ,  nor to alter their 
constituents' evalua tions of party leader s .  But individuals can 
affect their images in the constituency , and the l ittle bit they can 
affect may be of equal importance to them as the great deal that they 
cannot ,  Moreover, within the ranks of elected officials ,  there are 
further d ivisions , The mini ster sit ting in a safe seat may share the 
academics' di sdain f or a piddl ing personal vote,  but to the ambitious 
politician in a marginal seat tho se one to two thousand vote s may mean 
the difference between a successful po l itical career and obl iv ion . 
A second reason why constituency service in Britain might be 
of more importance than its present impact on the popular vote would 
indicate is the simple fact that service activity may be growing in 
importance.  Our el ite interviews contain numerous sugge stions that 
"this sort of thing " has become a larger part of the MP's job in 
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recent years -- some time s to the di smay of ol der MPs.  Cons tituency 
parties increasingly require their MPs to l ive in the district . And, 
as discussed earl ier, there has been an increase in the frequency of 
surgerie s .  Such indica tions of increasing const ituency orientation 
have potential ly important electoral implica tions , Whatever the 
signif icance of constituency work f or electoral behavior today , it may 
be considerably greater than it was two decades ago, and perhaps 
considerably les s than it might be two decades hence , For the earl ier 
period we have the But ler-Stokes representation study, though the data 
are still  restricted,  For the contemporary period, we have the 
surveys discus sed in this paper, And we can monitor the future and 
conduct studies accordingly . This contrasts with the American case in 
which electoral change went unnoticed until it was too late to measure 
some of the variables which might pl ausibly have produced the change . 
The subject of electoral change in Brit ain has received 
considerable a ttention in recent year s ,  and we need refer to nothing 
so grand as the current Social Democra tic challenge to the e s tabli shed 
Conservative and Labour partie s ,  Less dramatica l ly ,  Crewe (1974) 
describes such trends as the declining share of the vote captured by 
the two major parties,  decl ining turnout , and increasing inter­
election volatility in the two-par ty swing , Probab ly less 
significant , but even more interest ing from the standpoint of the 
research described in this paper are the reports of small departures 
in the 1979 resul ts from established patterns of British electoral 
behavior, Consider some selected remarks of Profes sors Curtice and 
Steed in their de tailed statistical appendix to the most recent 
Nuffield election study ( Butler and Kavanagh ,  1980) : 
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The 1974-1979 swing was not uniform : it varied more from seat 
to seat than in any other election since 1 950 ( 1980 , p. 394) . 
It is clear that Labour kept down the swing in it s marginal 
constituencies ,  particul arly in those with less  than a 2% two­
party majority • , , A major reason for the low swing , 
particularly the very low swing in the most marginal seats , is 
the effect of a change in incumbent MP since 1974, Because of 
the greater attention he can command in the media and the 
con stituency services he can render, an incumbent MP is more 
l ikely to be able to establish a personal vote ,  consisting o f  
tho se who support him a s  a n  individual ra ther than as a party 
representative, Where an MP does buil d  such a personal vote 
in his favour, that vote will be lost  if he is  defeated, If 
he does lose,  by the time of the next election the new 
incumbent MP may have acquired his own personal vote, The 
combined effect of these two personal votes would be a lower 
swing against the second incumbent at the following election , 
These 18 clear cases amount to strong evidence of the 
personal vote that an MP can build up . The low swing in them 
i s  consist ent and appears to be independent of location or 
type of con s tituency, For the period from 1974 to 1979 , it  
would apear that the double effect amounted to around 1500 
votes in an average s ized constituency , , , , , It i s ,  o f  
course ,  i n  marginal seats that MPs have the greatest incentive 
to work for such personal votes ( 1980, pp . 408-409) . 
• • • • • the more important and unexpected change is the 
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reduction in the number of marginal constituencie s ,  The 
f igures in Table 13 show that ,  on average , about 12 seats 
would change hands f or ea ch 1% swing, However, the equivalent 
tables produced af ter the 1964 and 1966 elections showed that 
about 18 seats would change hands for each 1% swing, This 
dramatic reduction in the number of seats l iable to change 
hands has undermined the 'cube law,' which if it holds,  does 
resul t in practice in about 18 seats changing hands f or each 
1% swing ( 1980 ,  pp . 428-429) . 
Non-uniform national swings? Incumbency effects? Vanishing 
marginals? De clining swing ratios? The American student of Erikson, 
Mayhew and Tuf te should be f orgiven a sudden rush of deja vu , though 
the magnitudes of the changes dis cus sed by Curtice and Steed are but a 
shadow of those observed in American Congressional elections , and the 
1979 result s may be aberrant, On the chance that they are not ,  
however , scholars should not bl ithely dismiss MP s '  activities and 
their a ssociated personal votes, And Americans s cholar s would do well 
to keep an eye on future electoral events in Britain, 
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FOOTNOTES 
1 .  This l iterature is cited, discus sed, synthesized and otherwise 
dealt with in two recent books on Congre s sional elections , Hinckley 
( 1981 ) and J acobson ( 1982 ) ,  
2 .  Pierce and Converse ( 1980) i s  a notable exception, albeit one 
which focuses on candidate visibility rather than the vote, Also to 
be noted are Tuf t e ' s  ( 1973) cross-national comparison of swing ratios ,  
and Stoke s '  ( 1968) contrast o f  "swing" i n  the United States and Great 
Britain. Such aggregate comparisons ref lect relative differences in 
di strict-level f orces ,  if not neces sarily individual candidate 
effect s .  
3 .  For an extended development o f  this argument , see Fior ina ( 1980) . 
4, The 1980 NES/CPS po s t-election survey included 1408 respondent s .  
The British Gal lup s urvey included 2031 respondents interviewed during 
the week following the 1979 election in a sampling frame covering 
Eng land, Scotland and Wales, In consultation with British Gal lup 
staff we selected a subset of the 1978 CPS/NES items and modified them 
(when nece s sary) for admini stration to a British sample, 
5 .  Note, however, that the effects of Cal laghan ratings are not even 
monotonic, let alone l inear, Relative to the omitted reference 
category, very poor, tho se who rate Callaghan fair, good,  or very 
good, are signif icantly more l ikely to vote Labour . Strangely , the 
small group of voters who offer no opinion of Callaghan are a s  
posi tively di sposed toward Labour as those who rate Cal laghen very 
30 
favorab ly . 
6 .  Butler and Kavanagh ( 1980 , p .  58,  p . 72) report that in 1979 Labour 
had only 70 ful l time paid agent s ,  and in 1978 the Conserva tives had 
346, In addition to these there are part-time , volunteer worker s ,  
typically par ty activi s t s, 
7, King f inds that in the post World War II period there has been a 
steady upward trend in the proportions of MPs wi th previous election 
defeats in their background, 
8 .  In each country we attempted to procure an e l ite interview for 
each cons tituency in the samping frame of the mas s  survey. In the 
United States we compl eted interviews for 102 of the 108 di stricts in 
the sample. Our target in the U, S, was the Congressional 
Admini strative Assistant (AA) whom exploratory research indicated 
would be the best source of information on office organization and 
activ ities, In Great Britain we compl eted interviews with MPs and/or 
party agent s in 101 of the 133 constituencies included in the sample, 
When reporting the data, of cour se , we include one interview for each 
of the 101 constituencies in the sampling frame, or in some ca ses only 
for the 69 consti tuencies f or which we procured an int erv iew with the 
incumbent MP.  
9 .  The MP responses wil l be di scussed a t  l ength along with analogous 
MC responses in a book now in prepara tion, 
1 0 .  Just over 40% of the respondents could reca l l  the name of any 
challenger for the Parliamentary seat , a figure much lower than the 
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incwnbent ' s ,  but also one more than twice a s  high a s  that for 
challengers of MCs . 
1 1 . Munroe ( 1977) s imilarly finds that only a small proportion of 
constituent approaches to MPs involve general is sue as oppo sed to 
personal concerns . 
1 2 .  Across the response categories , very helpful , somewhat helpful , 
not very helpfu l, don't know, depends ,  the American dis tribution was 
27% , 34% , 1 0% ,  25% , 4% , while the British distribution was 28% , 28% , 
1 1% ,  24% , 1 0% .  The analyses in Table 5 do not include the "don't 
know" and "depends" respons e s .  The vote analy se s i n  Tables 6 and 7 ,  
however, represent these categories along with the three ordinal 
categories as dummy variable s .  
13 . The contact v ariables are created from the fol lowing survey item :  
"There are many ways in which MP s  can have contact with the people 
from their constituency . On this page are some of these ways 
( respondent receives card), Think of (name) who has been the MP from 
this consti tuency . Have you come into contact or learned anything 
about h im/her through any of the se ways? " Based on Parker's ( 1981) 
analys i s  the responses were used to create two dummy variables: 
personal contact (met the incumbent , heard him/her at a meeting , 
talked to staf f ,  agent , secretary or other employee) , and media 
contact (mail,  newspaper/magazine ,  radio, TV) , 
1 4 .  The U. S .  equations in Tables 5 and 6 were also estimated u sing 
name recognition in place of name recall.  Generally the former ha s a 
l arger and more highly significant coeff icient , but other coefficient s 
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in the equations are no more than .02 different , and the overall f i t  
o f  the equations i s  n o  better , Thu s ,  in order to maximize 
comparab ility we report only the American equations using name reca l l .  
W e  a l s o  included campaign spending i n  the American equa tions but 
failed to find significant effect s .  Spending presumably purchases 
contact s and visibil ity , but direct measures of the latter already 
appear in the equations . 
1 5 .  In Tables 5-7 party affil iations are coded as follow s .  I n  the 
American sample all respondent s fall into mutual ly exclusive clas ses: 
same party as incumbent ( 51%) , independent ( 14% ) , oppos i te party from 
incumbent (35%) . In the British sample 38% share the party 
affiliation of the incumbent , and 17% admit to no party 
identification. The opposite party category includes adherents of any 
party whose MP is not of that party -- 45% . In order t o  pick up any 
additional differences between national and minor party identifier s ,  
an additional dummy variable, minor party ID , i s  include d .  This 
variable takes on a value of one for tho se 2 . 5% of the respondents who 
report an identification with other than the Conservativ e ,  Labour , or 
Liberal partie s .  To avoid s tati stical degeneracy in the analyse s ,  one 
category , opposite party ID, is omitted from each equation reported in 
Tab les 5-7 . 
1 6 .  We did not get a measure of satisfaction with second hand casework 
experience in Britain. Thus,  the dummy variable takes on a value of 
one for all those who report knowledge of friend, relative, or co­
worker experience, The large and highly significant coefficient 
sugge s t s  that the effect s of satisfactory second hand experience are 
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very strong , given that the estima te in the table i s  watered down by 
inclusion of a presumed minority who recal l unsatisfactory 
experience s ,  
1 7 .  Again, we see the large ,  significant coefficient s on the "don' t 
know" ca tegories of the Callaghan ra ting variable s .  The se 
coeff icients are based on a sma l l  number of cases (n=l8 in the Labour 
equation, n=29 in the Conservative equa tion) . As Conver se ( 1966) 
sugge s t s ,  these are indiv idual s  who are poorly educated and pay little 
at tention to public affairs ,  
18 . That is , .02 i s  the difference in estimated probabil ity of a 
Conservative identifier supporting a Conserva tive incumbent whom he 
bel ieves would not be helpful if a problem arose and that of 
supporting a Conservat ive MP who would be very helpfu l,  The other 
differences mentioned in the text are analogous , 
19 . The American figures are cal culated under the assumption that the 
voter does not reca l l  the incumbent or chal lenger, and approves of 
Carter' s performance if a Democrat, disapproves if an Independent , and 
strongly di sapproves if a Republ ican , Again, these as sumptions 
reflect modal respon se s in the sample.  
20 . The actual distribution of the 101 di strict s across the 0 - 4 
scale was 16 , 21 , 28 , 31 , 5 ,  The ana lysis  in Table 9 util izes 85 of 
the 101 case s ,  excluding retiree s ,  seats won in by-elections during 
1974-1979 , and seats held by Liberals and Na tionali s t s ,  
21 . The detail s  o f  this analysis are discussed a t  length i n  Cain 
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( 1982) . 
22 . Wil liams' ( 1966-1967) analy sis did not utilize a measure of 
constituency effor t .  Ra ther, he sought more broadly to estimate the 
personal votes of "familiar" Labour versus 11f amil iar11 Conservative 
MP s .  A "familiar" MP was defined as one with 8 o r  more year s' 
service .  
23 . Bear in mind , however, that Curtice and S teed a ttempt t o  estimate 
the actual personal vote in their sample of margina l s .  In contra s t ,  
our f igures again represent the potential electoral difference be tween 
a very low l evel of constituency effort and a very high leve l ,  
averaged across both marginal and nomnarginal district s .  
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